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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2663 
___________ 
 
YOUNES KABBAJ, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GOOGLE INC., a Delaware Corporation; 
AMAZON INC., a Delaware Corporation; 
YAHOO INC., a Delaware Corporation, 
JOHN DOES 1-10 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-01522) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 30, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 10, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Younes Kabbaj appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, which granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss his complaint, 
denied his motions for leave to amend, and dismissed his remaining motions as moot.  
Because no substantial question is raised by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 1  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Kabbaj filed a complaint in the District Court against Google, Inc., Amazon, Inc., 
Yahoo, Inc., and ten “John Doe” defendants, charging defamation, tortious interference 
with contract, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on 
various online postings.2  The District Court, in a comprehensive opinion, properly held 
that Kabbaj’s claims against Google, Amazon, and Yahoo are barred by the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3).  See Green v. America 
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2003) (Act provides immunity to 
interactive computer service providers “as a publisher or speaker of information 
originating from another information content provider”). 
                                              
1 We note that Kabbaj’s motions include many matters that are extraneous to this appeal.  
Our jurisdiction is limited to a review of the District Court’s order entered on April 7, 
2014. 
 
2 Kabbaj also included a “Count” for “Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,” but we agree 
with the District Court that declaratory and injunctive relief are remedies rather than 
causes of action.  Because the remaining counts of Kabbaj’s complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, the District Court also properly dismissed 
Kabbaj’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief. 
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 Kabbaj also argues that the District Court erred by failing to allow him to amend 
his complaint.  But a court need not grant an opportunity to amend a complaint if 
amendment would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Kabbaj sought to add the American School of Tangier and Brian Albo as 
defendants.  We agree with the District Court that those claims would be properly 
brought in Kabbaj v. American School of Tangier, D. Del. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-00431, and 
that pursuant to an order in that litigation, Kabbaj must seek permission before suing 
those parties.  See id., dkt. #54 at 2.  Thus, we agree that allowing amendment would 
have been futile. 
 Because we are summarily affirming the District Court’s judgment, we will deny 
Kabbaj’s pending motions as moot. 
